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  THE END OF (META) SEARCH ENGINES IN EUROPE? 
MARTIN HUSOVEC1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of us know the Internet as presented in our web-browsers such as Fire-
fox. We often even think of what we see in our browsers as ‘the Internet’. Howev-
er, there is an entire ‘underground world’ that is also ‘the Internet’, in which users 
of browsers never set foot. It is because the browser is designed for humans.2 This 
parallel ‘Internet underground’ is inhabited by virtual robots, such as webbots, 
spiders and screen scrapers. Their ‘body’ is constituted by lines of computer code 
and they work for us in order to supply us with amazing services that improve our 
lives. 
On a daily basis, we take advantage of them in order to read our fresh news 
before breakfast, to find a good connection to our office or a special diet lunch at a 
local restaurant, to check the availability of flights for our upcoming business trip 
or just to compare prices of different suppliers in the course of our work. Some of 
these services are based on what is called ‘data scraping’, a technique in which a 
computer program known as a robot extracts data from human-readable output 
coming from another program. Google, Bing or Yahoo, all use this technique daily. 
Meta search engines are no exception.  Met search engines are services that enable 
search in multiple searchable databases, They also operate through the use of ro-
bots that visit third party websites, scrape data and present it to humans in a web-
browser. All of this happens most of the time without first seeking a permission 
from the source of such data. This ‘consent-architecture’ thus strongly favors de-
centralized innovation.3 
In Europe, many civil lawsuits have been filed against the operators of meta 
search engines over the past several years. Very recently, operation of many of 
these search engines was recently escalated to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union for further scrutinty. In December 2013, the Court handed down its Innoweb 
C-202/12 ruling,4 where it held that the operation of meta search engines is likely 
to infringe database rights of indexed websites if the databases powering these sites 
constitute protectable subject matter. In order to assess the impact of this ruling on 
1. IMPRS-CI Doctoral Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competi-
tion in Munich; Visiting Researcher at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford University; 
Author would like to thank to Arthur von Martels and Sandeep M. Hedge for their valuable assistance 
on this paper. 
2. MICHAEL SCHRENK, WEBBOTS, SPIDERS, AND SCREEN SCRAPERS (Serena Yang et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2012). 
3. See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2012).
4. See Case C-202/12, Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media BV, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
(Dec. 19, 2013). 
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different types of meta search engines, the broader legal and practical consequenc-
es of this ruling need to be examined. 
The paper proceeds in the following parts. Part I outlines the societal and 
business context in which different meta search engines today operate. In part II, 
the reader is introduced to some key legal concepts of European sui generis data-
base protection, including relevant investment and the scope of these rights. Part 
III provides a brief summary of the European national cases examining meta 
search engines and database protection.  Part IV explores  the Innoweb decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the following part V, the findings of 
the paper are summarized and critically analyzed against the business realities in 
which the meta search engines operate. Part VI briefly concludes the investigation. 
A. Evolution 
The first generation of meta search engines arose around 2000, when Side-
step and FareChase were launched as the first two vertical online search engines 
for the air travel industry.5 Although, the then used screen-scraping technology 
often led to server traffic congestion, the industry was also realizing a decrease in 
the distribution costs this was leading to.6 Some suppliers adjusted to the needs of 
screen-scraping technique, others started providing more convenient XML feeds7 
to meta search engines in order to avoid being screen-scraped. The launch of Kay-
ak (2005) started the second generation of these services. Because it substantially 
improved the price transparency and enabled search based on the product charac-
teristics, it soon became the market leader among the meta search engines. When 
Kayak acquired Sidestep, it gave Kayak the scale to break profitability8 and meta 
search engines in general started expanding. Kayak was followed by Skyscanner, 
Momondo, Lilingo, Trivago, Tripadvisor and others from different fields (e.g. cars, 
insurance, bank fees, electricity, etc.). 
The advent of meta search in the travel distribution market was a great exam-
ple of disruptive innovation.9 Services of meta search engines naturally started 
competing with an older form of travel distribution from late 1970s. Travel indus-
try at the time was marked with high barrier-to-entry imposed by the complexity of 
distribution of the products.10 Because the market structure of this older system 
was oligopolistic, it was also enjoying higher margins11 and consumers were also 
5. Nelson Granados et. al., The Emerging Role of Vertical Search Engines in Travel Distribution: 
A Newly-Vulnerable Electronic Markets Perspective, PROC. OF THE 41ST HAW. INT’L CONF. ON 
SYSTEM SCIENCES 5 (2008), available at http://www.hicss.hawaii.edu/hicss_41/decisionbp/oscse11.pdf. 
6. Id. 
7. Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a markup language that defines a set of rules for
encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and machine-readable. 
8. Hugo Burge, How Meta-Search Became Mainstream and Why it’s Becoming Mega Important, 
EYEFORTRAVEL (Jul. 16, 2013), available at http://www.eyefortravel.com/distribution-strategies/how-
meta-search-became-mainstream-and-why-it%E2%80%99s-becoming-mega-important. 
9. The term disruptive technologies was coined by Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen
in their article Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the 
Wave, 73 HAR. BUS. REV., no. 1, 1995, at 45, 47. 
10. Granados, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id. at 7.
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paying correspondingly higher prices. Even though the old distribution system was 
never entirely replaced, the de-intermediation, the change of the market structure 
and the increased market transparency (price, quality and other good characteris-
tics) all caused by meta search engines led to a decrease in the end prices for con-
sumers. 
Naturally, striking changes like these did not and will not necessarily follow 
in all the other industries, where meta search engines start operating. Their en-
trance in usually more competitive markets thus can have less dramatic conse-
quences for the established players.12 In these industries, however, legal objections 
to meta search arise only seldomly. As will be shown in the comparative part, most 
of the time it is less competitive monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures 
that lead to such objections and follow-on lawsuits. 
B. Business models 
Meta search engines today operate with relatively low revenues per individu-
al user.13 They receive the revenue by either charging their users or their suppliers 
(e.g. airline companies). In addition, they earn by selling the advertising, comple-
mentary products, or collected information about behavior of their consumers. 
Kayak – a travel comparison website, for instance, does not charge its users. The 
booking is carried out by consulting the source website, but sometimes even direct-
ly14 from Kayak’s website. It earns its revenue via referrals to travel suppliers and 
on-line travel agencies (airline ticket referrals – 27%, hotel referrals – 14%, and 
car rentals & cruise referrals – 3% of its total revenue), and from advertising 
placements on its websites and mobile applications (58% of the total revenue).15 
Meta search engines sometimes charge as two sided markets, i.e. one side of 
the market (suppliers) would subsidize the service for the benefit of the other side 
(users) that is more valued. But sometimes they operate under a more regular mer-
chant configuration,16 charging buying users (not suppliers) for the convenience 
and the decrease in the transaction (search) costs they are provided with. 
Recently, meta search engines increasingly try to improve their control of the 
booking processes17 (e.g. direct booking) and squeeze additional revenue from it. 
Strong diffusion of mobile phones is only likely to increase this trend due to poorer 
user experience.18 Greater integration of the booking processes into their business 
12. This might be also one of the reasons why we generally see less litigation in this part of the
market. 
13. Movers in Meta-Search: Path Breaking Innovation in The Quest for Bookings, 
EYEFORTRAVEL (Feb. 13, 2013). http://www.eyefortravel.com/distribution-strategies/movers-meta-
search-path-breaking-innovation-quest-bookings [hereinafter Movers].  




16. For a discussion of merchant versus two sided-market configuration see Andrel Hagiu, Mer-
chant or Two-Sided Platform?, 6 REV. NET. ECON. 2 (2007). 
17. Movers, supra note 13. 
18. Movers, supra note 13, where the director of Asia Pacific for SkyScanner says: “It makes a lot
of sense on mobile devices where the downstream experience is often poor. We will see more of this.” 
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models, however, also leads to more significant resistance and legal problems from 
the indexed websites as it often tips the balance of mutual profitability. 
II. LEGAL SITUATION
Although this article will pay a special attention to the European sui generis 
right, this is not meant to suggest that the modus operandi of the meta search en-
gines, and data scraping in general, operates in some form of legal vacuum outside 
of this special right. Copyright law, law of unfair competition and even contract 
law can all to a certain extent pose an obstacle to their operation. This, of course, 
greatly depends on the jurisdiction. Both very relaxed copyright thresholds19 
and/or a restrictive interpretation of unfair competition laws can lead to very strong 
protection of investment in the non-original databases. Due to a diversity between 
existing approaches, this paper examines only legal framework under the European 
sui generis database right, which is a unique approach in protecting investment in 
the non-original subject matter. By definition, the paper therefore only discusses 
those scenarios when meta search engines process non-original elements protected 
under this regime. Thus excluded here is any re-use of creative elements such as 
pictures or articles from its investigation and national protection regimes going 
beyond the European law.20 
A. Database right 
Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases (Directive) is based on an 
assumption that because of the disproportion between the fixed costs needed to 
create a database21 and the marginal costs needed to copy or access it,22 the neces-
sary investment of human, technical and financial resources can be only re-
couped23 if artificial scarcity by means of a new intellectual property right is 
created on the market.24 This newly acquired exclusive right would then enable 
19. See Ryanair Ltd. v. PR Aviation BV, Case C-30/14 (pending case). For a discussion of an old
Dutch copyright doctrine of ‘Geschriftenbescherming,’ see also Bernt Hugenholtz, Goodbye, Geschrift-
enbescherming! KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), http://kluwercopyrightblog.com.  
20. Any extra national doctrines of misappropriation that go beyond the sui generis right are also
outside of the scope of this article. These national extensions of sui generis protection, however, are not 
without limitations, because they must be justified against the basic freedoms of the European union 
under Article 37 of the Treaty about Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See Annette Kur, 
Nachahmungsschutz und Freiheit des Warenverkehrs - der wettbewerbsrechtliche Leistungsschutz aus 
der Perspektive des Gemeinschaftsrechts, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR EIKE ULMANN (Hans J Ahrens & Joachim 
Bornkamm & Hans P Kunz-Hallenstein ed..2006). 
21. See Council Directive 96/9, recital 40, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20, 28 (EU) [hereinafter Directive
96/9] (“any investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of a database for the limited 
duration of the right; whereas such investment may consist in the deployment of financial resources 
and/or the expending of time, effort and energy”). 
22. See id. at recital 7.
23. See id. at recital 12 (“an investment in modern information storage and processing systems
will not take place within the Community unless a stable and uniform legal protection regime is intro-
duced for the protection of the rights of makers of databases”). 
24. Thus relying on ‘temporary monopoly’ obtained by first-mover advantage. Suzanne
Scotchmer notes that “In practice, there is little or no evidence that lack of protection has impeded the 
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producers of such databases, for a limited time, not only to charge the price above 
the marginal cost for use of its database, but also to select other market participants 
who can take advantage of it, and thus boost the database production. 
Although, the empirical validity of this proposition is intensively debated,25 
the Court of Justice of the EU is more and more often asked to flesh out the differ-
ent concepts behind this investment protection. Even though the Court on the sur-
face reflects the utilitarian rationale behind such protection,26 the latest decisions27 
show a certain disconnection between the incentive paradigm and the application 
of granted rights in the practice. 
B.  (Ir)relevant investment 
Metaphorically speaking, you don’t only need to bring a sufficient amount of 
water (qualitatively and quantitatively substantial investment) to cultivate the right 
fields (subject matter), but you also have to put it in the rights buckets (types of 
investment). If you fail to do so, you will not harvest any sui generis protection. 
The subject matter of the sui generis right is defined as a “collection of inde-
pendent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way 
and individually accessible by electronic or other means” (Art. 1(2) Directive). Or 
as English judge Laddie put it, a database is a “searchable collection of independ-
ent works.”28 The threshold triggering the protection is defined as the “qualitative-
ly and/or quantitatively substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification 
or presentation of the contents” (Art. 7(1) Directive). Although the language of 
‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of an investment is alternative, the “deployment of finan-
cial resources and/or the expending of time, effort and energy” must at least be of 
some relation to value for the end-database.29 Otherwise, the Directive would un-
justifiably favor companies of bigger scale and the protection could be uncontrol-
lably inflated by buying even valueless or otherwise cost-free parts of the database 
just to obtain the protection.30 After all, the mere fact that people trade something 
creation of new databases.”  SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 82 (MIT Press 
Books 2006).  
25. See Matthias Leistner, The Protection of Databases, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE 
OF EU COPYRIGHT (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009) (discussing the methodology of the EU study on the 
effectiveness of the protection); ROBIN E. HERR, IS THE SUI GENERIS RIGHT A FAILED EXPERIMENT? 
(Djoef Publishing, 2008) (discussing justification in general); JOSEF KRÄHN, DER RECHTSSCHUTZ VON 
ELEKTRONINISCHEN DATENBANKEN UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES SUI-GENERIS-
RECHTS (Verlag, 2000) (discussing justifications in general). 
26. See generally Case C-203/02, The British Horseracing Board Ltd. and Others v. William Hill
Org. Ltd., 2004 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Nov. 9, 2004). BB 21.5.2(a). 
27. See generally Case C-202/12, Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media BV, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS (Dec. 19, 2013). See also Case C-202/12, Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media BV, 
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Dec. 19, 2013). 
28. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 3. 
29. Id. at ¶ 70. Per analogiam to assessing of the scope, where the investment “must be assessed
in relation to the volume of the contents of the whole of that database.” note 26. 
30. One can especially imagine this type of transactions among subsidiaries or within other market
transactions, where either the cost cannot be easily attributed to the exact goods exchanged or where 
transactions only serve the purpose of obtaining the protection. This latter case makes a commercial 
sense especially if the benefits of such protection offset the cost of paying for the data. The way to 
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for money does not automatically mean that it should be protected or treated as a 
relevant investment. 
According to the CJEU, what matters is that “the obtaining of those materi-
als, their verification or their presentation [..] required substantial investment in 
quantitative or qualitative terms, which was independent of the resources used to 
create those materials.”31 The Court then uses the following criteria for investment 
typestypes of investments) to establish the extent of relevant investment: 
 An investment in the obtaining content requires the maker to “seek out
existing independent materials and collect them in the database;”32
 An investment in the verification of content requires “ensuring the relia-
bility of the information contained in that database, to monitor the accura-
cy of the materials collected when the database was created and during its
operation;”33
 An investment in the presentation of content requires resources to be
“used for the purpose of giving the database its function of processing in-
formation;”34
 Any other investments should not be taken into account;35
It must be noted that the party claiming protection has the burden of proving 
all the facts substantiating the relevant investment, including in which of types of 
investments it belongs.36 This is an important design choice of this investment 
protection. Its grant can sometimes even lead to situations where two companies 
organizing the same data, but from different sources, could be treated differently 
for the purposes of granting protection. This is because measuring an investment is 
not objective, but rather subjective.37 Therefore, from the user’s perspective, a 
database can sometimes appear as a black-box, preventing its user from  determin-
ing with certainty whether it is protected or not. The reason for this is that many 
‘investment decisions’ happen behind the scenes, and thus are not generally acces-
sible otherwise. This situation is unlike copyright protection, which provides more 
transparency for such assessments.38 This current lack of transparency  should, in 
turn, create pressure to require stricter requirements on the disclosing and proving 
of actual investments. As the law currently stands, the chances of users of chal-
lenging the basis for the investments are very limited. 
prevent this would be to test the importance of the investment for protected subject matter and to ex-
clude also creation of the data when its merely outsourced to third parties (similar point raised by Herr, 
supra note 25, at 134, who notes that protecting such databases would be “wasteful and should be 
eliminated.”). 
31. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 35. 
32. Id. at ¶ 31.
33. Id. at ¶ 34.
34. See Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS ¶ 37 (Nov. 9, 2004).  
35. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 38. 
36. See Directive 96/9, supra note 21, at recitals 53, 54. 
37. The issues such as effectiveness or meaningfulness of the investment is not taken into account.
See  ANDREAS WIEBE & ANDREAS LEUPOLD , RECHT DER ELEKTRONISCHEN DATENBANKEN 15 (2004). 
38. Similar point is raised by Herr, supra note 25, at 127. 
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As mentioned earlier, an investment is only protected if it is first directed into 
what qualifies as a database and then if the investment is spent on either obtaining, 
verifying or presenting content. So how is this reflected in case of meta search? 
The databases that serve as sources for meta search engines are of very different 
types. Sometimes they are a ‘by-product’39 of the main commercial activity of the 
online indexed suppliers (e.g. flights databases). In other cases, they directly sup-
port the main activity of the indexed supplier (e.g review websites). Sometimes the 
contents of the database are also internally created (e.g. real estate dealers ads). 
And sometimes third parties create them for the database maker (e.g. user ads). 
Because the Directive aims to incentivize “the person who takes the initiative 
and the risk of investing,”40 one needs to question if all such database makers real-
ly do take a risk of investing, as some of these individuals would create these data-
bases anyway. And hence, one also wonders if individuals really do need the 
inducement of exclusive rights to create databases if the databases would be creat-
ed even in the absence of these rights. It can be argued that supporting such data-
bases with an exclusive right does not promote “the establishment of storage and 
processing systems for existing information,”41 because the makers of a collection 
of data already need the database for their regular course of business. Based on a 
similar rationale, the Dutch courts in the past followed so-called spin-off theory 
and were rejecting protection to databases that were by-products of some non-
database activity.42 
This spin-off theory, however, also has its drawbacks when considered from 
an incentive perspective. One could argue that an airline such as Ryanair can be 
also induced by exclusivity to make additional or parallel investments in the organ-
ization of its database beyond some ‘operational minimum’ needed to run its busi-
ness. Probably for these reasons the Court of Justice of the European Union tries to 
overcome the dilemma of induced vs. non-induced non-original databases by de-
veloping a test of relevant investments. The Court rejected spin-off theory as such 
in BHB v. Hill, where it noted that “the fact that the creation of a database is linked 
to the exercise of a principal activity in which the person creating the database is 
also the creator of the materials contained in the database does not, as such, pre-
clude that person from claiming the protection of the sui generis right.”43 At the 
same time, the Court, by re-calibrating the debate to another level also implicitly 
confirmed some of the rationale behind barring protection to many spin-offs. 
Namely, that a principal-activity effort spent on creation of the materials of the 
database, which would be probably performed anyway, does not qualify for a pro-
tection. 
39. See Leistner, supra note 25, at n.26 (sometimes also referred to as a “spin-off”). See Stephen
M. Maurer & Berndt Hugenholtz & Harlan J. Onsrud, Europe’s Database Experiment, 294 SCIENCE 
789 (2001). Or alternatively the term “synthetic data” has also been used in this context.  
40. See Directive 96/9, supra note 21, at recital 41. 
41. See The British Horseracing Board Ltd. and Others v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS ¶ 31 (Nov. 9, 2004). 
42. See Maurer & Hugenhotlz, supra note 39, at 790. 
43. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 35. 
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But even the presented distinction between relevant and irrelevant invest-
ment44 is not as easy to apply as it seems.45 Let’s demonstrate this in the examples 
of meta search for a) airline tickets, b) used cars and c) user reviews. 
 Meta search engines for airline tickets source databases that are a by-
product of the main activity, which means that both the creation of the in-
dependent content—irrelevant investment—and also its organization (ob-
taining, verification, presentation) into a database—relevant investment—
are done by the same entity perhaps in course of the same business. Air-
lines like Ryanair greatly need this kind of information for a proper opera-
tion of its flight business and, of course, its own resale of the tickets.
What amount of investment goes beyond some ‘operational minimum’
necessary for the creation of data is difficult to say and also to estimate,
even for Ryanair. How does one distinguish between an investment in the
system that is used to type in or generate the flights connections, and an
investment in the system that then organizes them into a structure, if both
of them are developed as one computer system? In such case, the invest-
ments are mixed, and unless they can be separated, a single regime is
needed.
 Meta search engines for used cars, on the other hand, source information
that is posted by third parties on their platforms. This information could
be either regular user-generated content, or submitted by contracted sub-
mitters. An example is when information is collected within car resale
software that is licensed to car dealers for accounting purposes.46 The
question is whether the investment in creation of the software is still an
investment in creating data, or if it is an investment in obtaining data. And
does it matter if the software is licensed to these submitters for a fee? An
argument can be made in support of either side. But if viewed through the
incentive paradigm, the software-licensing context suggests that the grant-
ing of protection was not necessary to compile the database, if it was pro-
vided as software. On the other hand, if the software was provided free of
charge or below value in order to collect the data for a platform, then the
protection should be granted, as the investment risk is in the collection it-
self.
 Meta search engines for user reviews would usually source information
posted by third party users on their respective rating or ecommerce plat-
forms (e.g. Amazon). Such compilations of user reviews help to improve
either sold services, or are a service in itself. In either case, reaching out
44. See Leistner, supra note 25, at 436. 
45. See Leistner, supra note 25, at 436 n.31. 
46. See Digital Disruption on the Farm, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2014, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21602757-managers-most-traditional-industries-distrust-
promising-new-technology-digital. This example is in fact commonplace. An example is prescriptive 
planting, where farmers feed the predictive systems with data; Digital disruption on the farm, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 24, 2014; see also Getting Personal, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13437974 ( personalized medicine, where data comes from patients or 
their doctors, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2009). 
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to users to submit the reviews is more easily qualified as the obtaining da-
ta. However, the advertising expenditure per se can still in itself be an im-
perfect estimation of an investment, because unless specifically targeted, 
it primarily aids the sales, not reviews. 
The three examples above pose, in one way or another, the problem in distin-
guishing between obtaining and creating of data, and subsequently the problem of 
what to do with mixed investments. Regarding the latter, the Court of Justice of the 
EU in its Fixtures Marketing C-46/02 decision, endorses the view that investments 
“indivisibly linked to the creation of those data”47 and “too closely linked”48 in-
vestments are irrelevant. For the former, the Court did not yet develop any test that 
could be used. In the Fixtures Marketing decision, this distinction was arguably 
more obvious. This, however, should not mislead us into believing that this is the 
case most of the time. On the contrary, as the three examples of database sources 
above have shown, these distinctions need more than just linguistic factors in order 
to be predictably solved. 
One solution is suggested by Leistner,49 who proposes to read BHB v. Hill 
narrowly so that the grant or refusal of the protection should depended on whether 
granting rights creates some barriers to competition.50 This approach, however, 
does not satisfy utilitarian grounds for granting protection—under the incentive 
paradigm that precedes post-grant effects on the competition. Instead, it would 
mean that even those databases which did not need the special inducement of ex-
clusive rights will be granted protection as long as they are not what he refers to as 
‘sole source databases,’ or created databases that cannot be obtained anywhere else 
(e.g. telephone listings, matches fixtures, etc.).51 Leistner’s reading of BHB v. 
Hill’s seems to miss the point that the court based its rejection, not on the post-
grant effects on competition, but rather on the absence of any need of for induce-
ment by some separate database right.52 Self-creation of data helps to weed out the 
cases where the investment would be made even in the absence of protection, or in 
a completely different subject matter. In both of these cases, the lack of any market 
failure would prevent its deployment. 
Let’s demonstrate this with an example. If meteorological stations create da-
tabases (collections of information) as their main activity (carrying out measure-
ments),53 the correct question is not whether the granting of such protection would 
47. See Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS ¶ 44 (Nov. 9, 2004). Fixtures Marketing, 2004 I-10365, ¶ 44. 
48. See id.at ¶ 46. 
49. See Leistner, supra note 25, at 434-435, 446. 
50. See SCHRENK, supra note 2, at 436-437 (noting that this ‘competition-oriented’ definition of
relevant investment can advert most of the potential structural and typical dangers of the sui generis 
right). 
51. Id. at 437.
52. See Maurer & Hugenholtz, supra note 39, at 790. 
53. Herr, supra note 25, at 133. If the measurements need to be supported by such an incentive,
then the database protection would in fact protect the effort of measuring, and not of organization of 
that measuring in some database, similar in relation to “protection of data collected by satellites, supra 
note 24, at 133).” See Wiebe & Leupold, supra note 37, at 16. Wiebe et al. suggest to distinguish be-
tween measuring/observation of data on the one hand, and creation of the data on the other. Only the 
first, in their opinion, should qualify for protection.  
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lead to anti-competitive results, but whether society needs to induce the creation of 
these databases with exclusive rights in the first place.54 And if, in their absence, 
the same amount of investment would be made. The fact that such a grant would 
not create problems for competition since such meteorological data can be ob-
tained in parallel by competing stations does not, in itself, legitimize the grant on 
the utilitarian grounds upon which the Directive is based. After all, we do not grant 
protection over new subject matter only because it has no anti-competitive effects. 
Instead, we look for market failures. 
Therefore the requirement of separable substantial investment in obtaining 
data should serve the following goals. First, the database maker must clearly be 
able to identify and estimate the part of the relevant investment that was made. 
General evidence, without the identification of exact categories is not enough. 
When in doubt, or when the maker fails to do so, the protection should not be 
granted. Secondly, the fact that irrelevant investments like creation of data are 
done at the same time, or even in course of same business, should not matter as 
long as identification and isolation are successful. Third, the division between 
obtaining and creating data should depend on the context of activity in which the 
investment was made and connection to the end-database. It is submitted that the 
case-law of the CJEU should in this last respect be read through the incentive par-
adigm. From this perspective, sorting out irrelevant investments serves to exclude 
databases whose creation are not incentivized by the grant of any database rights.55 
Applying this perspective to these examples, we now arrive at the following 
results. If a database operator give a database additional functions to process the 
information, this and only this investment needs to be viewed as relevant. For 
airline databases like Ryanair, this means that their investment can be still protect-
ed even if they also produce their data, but only if they take and document any 
additional expenses required by the functionality of their databases. But protection 
will still extend only to this substantial relevant effort, not to the irrelevant efforts 
that are indivisibly linked to the creation of database entries (e.g. dates of flights, 
prices, etc.).56 If applied to our car dealer’s accounting software, protection would 
be granted only if exploitation of the software was not sufficient to recoup the 
investment. Hence, an artificial creation of a separate market for the exploitation of 
data is necessary. Lastly, if applied to user-generated reviews, the database housing 
the reviews would be protected as long as the platform operator can separate the 
investment from the collection of data itself. 
In conclusion, an investor receives an exclusive right only over separable and 
provable substantial investment in obtaining, presenting and verifying the elements 
of a database. The operator will not receive protection for other investments in the 
database, even if they are inseparably linked to obtaining, presenting and verifying 
54. See Leistner, supra note 25, at 438, 455 (discussing meteorological data). See also Maurer &
Hugenholtz, supra note 39, at 790. Hugeholtz, on the other hand, classifies this as spin-off data that 
should not be protected. 
55. See Herr, supra note 25, at 130, 198 (suggesting similar approach). 
56. See ESTELLE DERCLAYE, DATABASES SUI GENERIS RIGHT: WHAT IS A SUBSTANTIAL 
INVESTMENT? A TENTATIVE DEFINITION (2005), reprinted in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 
(Fiona Macmillian ed. 2007); see also THE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION 2, 4 (2005) (noting that these databases probably should not enjoy protection). 
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content. At the same time, obtaining contents of a database does not cover its crea-
tion. The division between obtaining content and creating content cannot be de-
rived semantics, but only from the context in which data collection occurs. The 
CJEU,has yet to provide the ultimate test for this separation. The author suggests 
that the court  examine the business context in which the investment was made to 
determine whether granting exclusive rights is necessary to recoup the investment. 
C. Scope of the right 
When an investment effort is directed into relevant subject matter in a neces-
sary scale, the investor is granted the following scope of exclusivity over his 
achievement:57: 
 Protection against permanent or temporary copying of the substantial part
of the contents of a database (Extraction),
 Protection against making available to the public of the substantial part of
the contents of a database (Re-utilization),
 Protection against the repeated and systematic copying and making avail-
able to the public of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database,
provided that such acts conflict with a normal exploitation of the database
or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of its maker.
As the Directive explains in one of its recitals, it “seeks to safeguard the posi-
tion of makers of databases against misappropriation of the results of the financial 
and professional investment made in obtaining and collection the contents by pro-
tecting the whole or substantial parts of a database against certain acts by a user or 
competitor.”58 According to the Court, the sui generis regime aims at protecting 
the database maker against depriving him of revenue which should have enabled 
him to redeem the cost of the investment.59 The Directive, however, does not pro-
hibit any kind of taking of advantage from the protected investments, but only one 
that “go[es] beyond users legitimate rights and thereby harm[s] the investment.”60 
This should also include “the manufacture of a parasitic competing product” or 
acts causing “significant detriment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the 
investment.”61 
In other words, the scope of the rights also takes into account conflicting in-
terests (other policy considerations), and thereby does not protect any kind of busi-
ness model, which the maker of a database uses in order to recoup the investment. 
And even though the maker of a database is naturally free to choose such a busi-
ness model, database law can reject its safeguarding entirely, or to some extent, 
provided protection as necessary in order to safeguard legitimate interests of the 
society. It is for these reasons that  part V of this paper argues that incorporating 
57. See Leistner, supra note 25, at 441. The elements are never a subject matter of the database,
but an effort or achievement is. 
58. See Directive 96/9, supra note 21, at recital 39. 
59. See Case C-203/02, The British Horseracing Board Ltd. and Others v. William Hill Org. Ltd.,
2004 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 51 (Nov. 9, 2004)., BHB v. Hill, 2004 I-10415, ¶ 51. 
60. See Directive 96/9, supra note 21, at recital 42. 
61. See id. 
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policy considerations of market transparency should have already been addressed 
in the infringement analysis, and not in the context of possible exceptions. 
Therefore, even though rights should be construed broadly,62 and also cover 
use for non-commercial purposes,63 the exact scope needs to be adjusted to address 
broader societal needs, and not only blindly follow business models used in certain 
cases.64 Moreover, the basic structure of the scope needs to be read together with 
the preconditions of such protection.65 This seems logical since it is difficult to 
assess what is a re-use of substantial part of an effort, if one does not know what is 
the relevant effort that serves as a benchmark for this qualitative or quantitative 
exercise.66 For instance, if Ryanair, deserves protection for its additional invest-
ments efforts, its protection can not spill-over the parts of the database that are 
composed of the irrelevant subject matter. 
More importantly, the protection of an effort does not extend to the mere el-
ements of a database.67 For this reason, the consultation of the protected database 
must never fall into the scope of the right.68 However, if a mere consultation of the 
contents becomes systematic, so that cumulatively the obtained relevant invest-
ment is substantial, such use of the database starts falling into the scope of the 
right,69 unless such acts do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the database 
or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of its maker. 
III. NATIONAL CASE-LAW
Since the early days of the database right, various plaintiffs have tried to in-
voke this right to protect against data scraping carried out by the meta search en-
gine operators. The most active one on the European continent was undoubtedly 
Ryaniar, a low cost airline based in Ireland. Ryanair pursues strong business motifs 
with its litigation. It is intensively focused on building a corporate image of being 
the cheapest European airliner. It seeks to earn its revenue by selling complemen-
tary products to which consumers are exclusively channeled,70 an effort that meta 
search engines could effectively undermine.71 
62. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 51; , BHB v.
Hill, 2004 I-10415, para 51, [2008] Case C-304/07, Directmedia Publishing GmbH v. Albert-Ludwigs-
Universitat Freiburg , 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 31 (Oct. 9, 2008).  
63. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 48., BHB v.
Hill, 2004 I-10415, ¶ 48. 
64. Bgh, Urteil, Flugvermittlung im Internet, [2004] I ZR 224/12 (Ger.). A similar argument was
presented by the BGH in its latest screen-scraping decision (Case I ZR 224/12), where it rejected to 
protect the mere expression of business ‘will’ of the plaintiff.  
65. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 81. BHB v.
Hill, 2004 I-10415, ¶ 81. 
66. See id. at  ¶ 69–71. 
67. See Directive 96/9, supra note 21, at recital 45. 
68. See British Horseracing Board Ltd., Case C203-02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶ 55., BHB v.
Hill, 2004 I-10415, ¶ 55. 
69. See id. at ¶ 83; See also Leistner, supra note 25, at 430, n.13. 
70. The Next Big Thing?, THE ECONOMIST, (May 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2014/05/google?fsrc=rss. Ryanair seems to enter into a 
cooperation only with Google THE ECONOMIST, May 21, 2014; Comparative Advantage, THE 
ECONOMIST, (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2014/01/flight-
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A. Ireland 
Since 2008, Ryanair initiated several parallel lawsuits against meta search 
engines in Ireland. Until today, none of the following pending cases of Ryanair v. 
Bravofly,72 Ryanair v. Billigfluege.de,73 Ryanair v. Onthebeach,74 Ryanair v. Tick-
et Point Reisebüro,75 Ryanair Ltd. v. Club Travel Limited,76 and Ryanair Ltd v. 
Unister,77none waswere decided on the merits. Some were already dismissed due 
to jurisdictional issues, and in others, the request for preliminary injunction was 
denied. 
B. Italy 
In 2013, the Milan court found in Ryanair v. Viaggiare78 that Viaggiare’s ac-
tivity of data scraping from Ryanair’s website for the purposes of operating a flight 
meta search engine, did not affect its investment relevant for a database right.79 
Also since Ryanair holds a monopoly in the downstream market for the provision 
of information for its own flights (sole source), it abused its dominant position by 
rejecting access to an essential facility it owns by refusing the access to the data-
base,.80 
C. France 
In 2007, Ryanair initiated proceedings against Opodo, a company operating a 
flight meta search engine. Opodo’s business model was based on charging users an 
additional fee. The Grand Instance Court in Paris rejected (2010)81 the action find-
comparison-websites. Google’s CEO was recorded to say that: “It’ll blow comparison sites like Sky-
scanner out of the water,” Michael O’Leary, Ryanair’s boss, told the Irish Independent in his first 
interview about the partnership. Given that European market leader Skyscanner cannot display Rya-
nair’s prices, he could well be right. 
71. Flugvermittlung im Internet, Case I ZR 224/12, 2004. BGH pronounced that this interest per
se cannot be protected. 
72. Ryanair Ltd v. Bravofly and Anor [2009] IEHC 41 (Jan. 29, 2009).
73. Ryanair Ltd v. Billigfluege.de GMBH [2010] IEHC 47 (Feb. 26, 2010).
74. Ryanair Ltd v. On the Beach Ltd [2013] IEHC 124 (Mar.22, 2013). 
75. Ryanair Ltd. v. Billigfluege.de GMBH [2010] IEHC 47 (Feb. 26, 2010).
76. Ryanair Limited v. Club Travel Limited [2012] IEHC 165 (Mar. 23, 2012). 
77. Ryanair Ltd. v. Unister [2013] IESC 14 (Mar. 13, 2013). 
78. Ryanair Ltd. v. Viaggiare, Case 7825/2013, Trib. Di Milano, July 6, 2013 (It.).
79. See Gabrielle Accardo, Milan Court Finds That Ryanair Abused its Dominant Position in the
Market for Online Travel Agencies, TTLF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY NEWS (Jul. 10, 2013), 
http://ttlfnews.wordpress.com/2013/10/07/milan-court-finds-that-ryanair-abused-its-dominant-position-
in-the-market-for-online-travel-agencies/. 
80. See, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. KG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG,
2004 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Oct. 2, 2003); see also Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann and 
Indep. Television Publ’n. ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Comm., 2005 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
(Apr. 6, 1995).  
81. See Ryanair Ltd. v. Opodo, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Apr. 9, 2010 (Fr.); see also
Estelle Derclaye, Recent French Decisions on Database Protection: Towards a More Consistent and 
Compliant Approach with the Court of Justice’s Case Law? 3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY 2, 4  (2012). 
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ing no infringement of a database right as Ryanair did not prove to have made 
substantial investments necessary to acquire such protection. Furthermore, the 
court found that Opodo was not bound by the terms of service on the website, and 
that the defendant’s conduct did not constitute a tort of parasitic unfair competition 
as its operation in fact brought Ryanair new customers. 
D. Spain 
In 2012, the Spanish Supreme Court decided the case of Ryanair v. Atrápa-
lo.82 Atrápalo is a Spanish meta search engine that engages in screen scraping of 
the Ryanair’s website in order to provide its comparison service to users. It adds a 
small fee to the flights. The court confirmed lower instance decisions and based on 
CJEU case law dismissed Ryanair’s copyright, sui generis database right and un-
fair competition claims.83 As to a possible infringement of a database right, the 
court concluded that Ryanair’s substantial investment was not directed to the ob-
taining of the data, but towards a creation of the information.84 Similar arguments 
and outcomes were encountered in Ryanair v. eDreams85 that also ended with a 
dismissal of Ryanair’s claims. 
E. Denmark 
In 2001, the first instance court in Copenhagen ruled in a dispute Home v. 
Ofir between a Danish real estate agency and Ofir a real estate aggregator/search 
engine. The latter was producing deep links to real estate advertisements on the 
Internet, including advertisements from the market leading estate agency chain 
Home. In the first instance judgment, the deep linking was found to infringe the 
database right of the plaintiff. In 2006, however, the second instance court, Danish 
Maritime and Commercial Court, took the exactly opposite position. The court 
accepted the use of deep links stressing that search engines and deep links are 
desirable for the functioning of the Internet.86 
82. Ryanair Ltd. v. Atrápalo, Case 572/2012, Tribunal Supremo, Oct. 9, 2012 (Spain). 
83. Roze Tailer, RYANAIR: Screen Scrapers, Databases, Free-Riding and Unfair Competition in
Spain, SCREEN SCRAPING SERVICES (May 1, 2013), 
http://screenscrapingservices.blogspot.de/2013/05/ryanair-screen-scrapers-databases-free.html. 
84. Id.
85. Ryanair Ltd. v. Vacaciones Edreams, Case 429/2009, Court of Appeal of Barcelona, Dec. 17,
2009 (Spain). 
86. Home A/S v. Ofir, Maritime and Commercial Court, Feb. 24, 2006 (Den.) (holding
“[d]ifferent kinds of search services which may be considered to be increasing in number on the Inter-
net must be considered to be desirable as being necessary for the functioning of today’s Internet as a 
medium for searching and exchanging an incredibly extensive and steadily increasing quantity of 
information. The database protection that is one purpose of the Database Directive also reflects these 
conditions. It must be considered that search services generally make available deep links whereby the 
user can efficiently directly arrive at the desired information which, as the Internet is established and 
functions, generally must be seen to comply with the interests followed by those who choose to use the 
Internet for the provision of information to the public.”). 
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F. Germany 
In 2003, German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) rendered its Paperboy87 de-
cision, which concerned copyright, unfair competition, and sui generis claims put 
forward by newspaper publishers against a local search engine. The Court held that 
as long as deep links in the search results do not circumvent technical restrictions, 
they do not constitute a use of the copyrighted work or an act of unfair competi-
tion. On the database protection side, the Court held that even systematic deep 
linking from a search engine to the entries in a database of newspaper articles does 
not fall into the scope of the sui generis right.88 
In 2008, the District Court in Frankfurt in case Cheaptickets v. Ryanair is-
sued a preliminary injunction against Ryanair restraining it from canceling the 
bookings carried out via Cheaptickets.89 The preliminary injunction was confirmed 
on the appeal (2009) before the Regional Court in Frankfurt am Main.90 The court 
held that screen scraping per se does not constitute an act of unfair competition or 
an infringement of the database rights.91 
In 2011, the BGH issued its influential ruling in a case Automobil-
Onlinebörse,92 where it took the position that a provider of software that enables 
comparison of different websites with car ads does not use93 that data himself, and 
hence, cannot be a direct infringer. Instead, the BGH focused on the conduct of the 
users and their possible violation of the database rights of scraped websites. This 
led the BGH to the conclusion that there was no infringement of database rights 
with regard to copying of a substantial part or with regard to systematic copying of 
insubstantial parts of a protected database. The Court also rejected a claim for 
unfair competition (the deliberate hindering of competitors).94 
87. Holtzbrinck v. Paperboy, Case I ZR 259/00, Bandesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice], July 17, 2003 (Ger.). 
88.  Svensson, Case C-466/12, Nils Svensson and Others v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2014 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS ¶ 41 (Feb. 13, 2014); see also Case C-202/12, Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media BV, 
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Dec. 19, 2013). The BGH treated ‘communication to the public’ under 
both the copyright law and sui generis protection explicitly alike (“Die oben .. dargelegten Gründe, aus 
denen das Setzen eines Hyperlinks keine urheberrechtliche Nutzungshandlung ist, gelten hier 
entsprechend.”). CJEU on the other hand, did not seem to synchronize these two rights when it held that 
the idea of deeplinking is unacceptable in the sui generis, but not in the copyright context. The sui 
generis protection is thus broader and effectively undermines the policy considerations in Svensson. It is 
true that full synchronization is not a completely tenable position given that sui generis protection in 
fact aims to remedy also inadequacy of copyright protection for the subject matter of databases. How-
ever, it appears contradictory from the court when the same policy reasons lead to such diverging 
conclusions. 
89. Cheaptickets v. Ryanair Ltd., Case 2/6 O 478/08, Landericht Frankfurt [LG] [Regional Court],
Sep. 24, 2008 (Ger.). 
90. Cheaptickets v. Ryanair Ltd., Case 6 U 221/08, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional
Court], Mar. 5, 2009 (Ger.). 
91. Id. The existence of such right was not discussed. 
92. Automobil-Onlinebörse, Case I ZR 159/10, Bandesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice], June 22, 2011 (Ger.). 
93. Id.; Automobil-Onlinebörse, at ¶ 20–21. The German term ‘öffentliche Wiedergabe’ (§ 87(1)
UrhG) corresponds to “making available to the public by on-line or other forms of transmission” (Art. 
7(2)(b) Directive) as a type of re-utilization. 
94. Id. Provision of § 4 Nr. 10 UWG legislates so called “gezielte Behinderung der Mitbewerber.” 
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Recently, the case Ryaniar v. Vtours [Flugvermittlung im Internet]95 was de-
cided by the BGH. In a preceding second decision on the merits of the case, the 
Regional Court in Hamburg96 accepted the protection of Ryanair’s database, but 
rejected arguments about an infringement of the scope of the right relying partial-
ly97 on the argumentation of Automobil-Onlinebörse case. The court, however, 
upheld the unfair competition claims arguing that if a reseller conceals his intent to 
resell to a supplier, he acts unfairly as the supplier has the right to freely choose 
either a direct or a selective distribution system. The decision, however, concerned 
an integrated booking system, where the meta search engine carries out a booking 
on behalf of the consumer.98 The Hamburg Court explicitly opined that a non-
integrated booking system (e.g. Skyscanner.net) can be legitimate.99 The part that 
was eventually pending before the BGH did not concern infringement of the data-
base right, but only this related claim for unfair competition. The Court rejected it, 
arguing that the operation of a meta search engine even with an integrated booking 
system does not constitute an act of unfair competition only because the source 
website did not allow this practice of screen scraping in its general terms and con-
ditions. At the same time, however, the Court noted that if Ryanair would apply 
technical protection measures,100 this could potentially be actionable. 
G.  The Netherlands 
In Ryanair v. Wegolo,101 the Utrecht District Court held that Ryanair had 
failed to show that its database was protected under the Directive, but found for an 
infringement of an old provision of the Dutch Copyright Act predating the Di-
rective protecting non-original writings.102 The Amsterdam Court of Appeal con-
firmed the non-infringement of the database right, but revoked the decision on the 
infringement of Dutch protection of non-original writings arguing that Directive’s 
‘lawful user’ exception also applies to the Dutch specific protection of non-original 
writings. The applicability of Article 6 and Article 8 to screen scraping of meta 
search engines recently ended up before the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion by referral from the Dutch Supreme Court (Ryanair C-30/14 case). 
95. Ryanair Ltd. v. Vtours [Flugvermittlung im Internet], Case I ZR 224/12, Bandesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 30, 2014 (Ger.). 
96. Ryanair Ltd. v. Vtours [Flugvermittlung im Internet], Case 5 U 38/10, Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg [OLG] [Higher Regional Court], Oct. 24, 2012 (Ger.). 
97. Automobil-Onlinebörse, Case I ZR 159/10. 
98. In the past, the defendant was also buying tickets directly for itself, and only then reselling to
its clients. After the lawsuit, however, it changed this business model. 
99. See Ryanair v. Vtours, Case 5 U 38/10 ¶ 3.
 100. So if Ryanair would for instance implement CAPTCHA to prevent robots from accessing its 
sub-pages, then it could possibly claim a violation. 
 101. See Ryanair Case C-30/14 Ltd. v. PR Aviation BV, Case C-30/14 (pending case); Ryanair – 
Grounding a go Compare an Airfare Website, EU LAW RADAR (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://eulawradar.com/case-c-3014-ryanair-grounding-a-go-compare-an-airfare-website/.  
 102.  Ben Hugenholtz, Goodbye, Geschriftenbescherming!, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (March 6, 
2013), http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2013/03/06/goodbye-geschriftenbescherming/.  “Government 
published a draft bill that would remove a single word (‘all’) from the text of Article 10(1) of the Dutch 
Copyright, and thereby put this relic of a distant past finally to rest.” 
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A second Dutch proceeding relates not to the meta search of flights, but to 
the search of car ads. In AutoTrack v. Gaspedaal (2007), in the first instance, the 
court found for the meta search engine.103 On appeal, the Regional Court of Ap-
peal in the Hague considered AutoTrack’s database to be protected, and then re-
ferred questions on the scope of the right to the CJEU (Innoweb C-202/12 case). 
IV. CJEU: INNOWEB
The previously mentioned Dutch proceedings in AutoTrack v. Gaspedaal 
gave rise to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Innoweb 
C-202/12 case.104 
Innoweb is a company that operates a dedicated car meta search engine called 
‘GasPedaal’ (literally ‘accelerator pedal’).  This meta search engine enables users 
to simultaneously carry out searches in several collected databases of car ads that 
are listed on third party sites. Plaintiff AutoTrack is the owner of one of the web-
sites used by Gaspedaal as a ‘source’ for its meta search engine. Through use of 
the GasPedaal service, it is possible to search through the AutoTrack collection 
using different criteria, including not only the make, the model, the mileage, year 
of manufacture, and price, but also other vehicle characteristics, such as the color, 
shape of chassis, type of carburant used, number of doors and transmission—and 
this all happens ‘in real time’, that is to say at the time when a GasPedaal user 
enters his query. 
The results presented by the AutoTrack website—cars meeting the criteria 
chosen by the end user—which are also to be found on the results pages of other 
sites that are merged into one item with links to all the sources where that car was 
found. A webpage with the list of the results shows essential information relating 
to each car, including the year of manufacture, the price, the mileage and a thumb-
nail picture. That webpage is stored on the GasPedaal server for approximately 30 
minutes and sent to the user or shown to him on the GasPedaal website, using the 
format of that site. Every day, GasPedaal carries out approximately 100.000 
searches on the AutoTrack website in response to queries. Thus, approximately 
80% of the various combinations of makes or models listed in the AutoTrack col-
lection are the object of a search by GasPedaal each day. 
Before getting to the merits of the case, it is important to note that CJEU an-
swered the reference questions “on the assumption that [the defendants] collection 
of advertisements constitutes a database”105 protected under Article 7 of Directive. 
The decision therefore cannot be immediately presented as a clear confirmation of 
actual infringement being carried out by all the meta search engines in the Europe 
operating in the different fields of industry. 
 103. See Arnoud Engelfriet, AutoTrack wint toch van Gaspedaal, IUSMENTIS (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://blog.iusmentis.com/2009/02/13/autotrack-wint-toch-van-gaspedaal/. 
 104. In the European Union, the system of preliminary rulings serves coherence in the interpreta-
tion of the Union law across the different Member States. The national courts are allowed, and in some 
cases even required, to ask for interpretative guidance from the CJEU. Its decisions are then binding in 
all the Members States as authoritative sources of the Union law. 
105. Innoweb, Case C-202/12, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 16. 
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First of all, Autotrack’s database of ads is very different from others used, for 
instance, by travel comparison websites that usually scrape ‘by-product databases’. 
Autotrack, unlike Ryanair, provides scraped information (collection of 200.000 car 
ads) as a its prime source of business. It makes relevant investment in collection 
and presentation of the car ads (database set-up, its advertisings to users), and 
subsequent verification of its contents (e.g. if the car in the ad was not stolen, or 
whether the indicated driven distance is still plausible). Autotrack does not make 
the entries itself, but the car ads are posted by its users.106 It is therefore reasonable 
to expect that unlike Ryanair’s databases, Autotrack’s database was indeed pro-
tected.107 
The referring Dutch court basically asked the CJEU whether an owner of a 
website with used car ads that were uploaded by users, can prevent a third party 
from ‘scraping’ its database of ads and thus effectively prohibit the meta search 
engine operation. After several remarks on how technologically dedicated real time 
meta search engines allegedly108 differ from general search engines like Google or 
Bing,109 the Court, relying mainly on contextual110 and teleological arguments,111 
came to the conclusion that GasPedaal infringes Autotrack’s database rights by re-
utilizing substantial parts of its database (article 7(2)(b) of Directive). 
According to the CJEU, GasPedaal is “depriving [Autotrack] of revenue 
which should have enabled him to redeem the cost of the investment”112 because it 
“is not limited to indicating to the user databases providing information on a par-
ticular subject”113 and orders duplications into one item.114 This, the Court states, 
“creates a risk that the database maker will lose income,”115 a risk that “cannot be 
ruled out by force of the argument that it is still necessary, as a rule, to follow the 
hyperlink to the original page on which the result was displayed.”116 
 106. Private individuals seem to post ads for free, whereas car dealers are only subject to subscrip-
tion fees. 
 107. See also Automobil-Onlinebörse, Case I ZR 159/10, Bandesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court 
of Justice], June 22, 2011 (Ger.). 
 108. The Court argues that the meta search engine at stake is different because (a) it makes use of 
the search engines on the websites covered by its service, (b) it offers advantages similar to those of the 
database itself in terms of the formulation of a query and the presentation of the results, and (c) are 
ranked, in a manner of the end user’s choosing, so as to reflect certain criteria in increasing or decreas-
ing order. In fact, all of this can be said also about the search engines. Firstly (a), virtually all the search 
engines would also take advantage of the local search engines in order to best map the indexed web-
sites. Secondly (b), formulation of queries might be also identical with these websites in many cases. 
Thirdly (c), any advanced search enables the user to better refine its search according to criteria pre-set 
by him such as copyright status of pictures, time of publishing, etc. All these alleged differences are 
therefore only a chimera, because the difference between a search engine and meta search engine is 
more of a specialization or business model, than of any technical differences. 
109. See Innoweb, Case C-202/12, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 24–29. 
110.  Id. at ¶ 33–34. 
111. Id. at ¶ 35–36. 
112. Id. at ¶ 37. 
113. Id. at ¶ 39. 
114. Id. at ¶ 43. 
115. See id. at ¶ 41. 
116. See id.at ¶ 44. 
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The Fifth Chamber of the CJEU, deciding without a prior opinion from an 
Advocate General, seemed to be generally disturbed by the increased competition 
and transparency that producers of databases might face117 and the changes in “the 
access route intended by the database maker.”118 The Court even went on to con-
clude that this behavior “comes close to the manufacture of a parasitical competing 
product.”119 The gist of the disturbance is probably best disclosed in the part, 
where the Court writes: “the end user no longer has to go to the website of the 
database, unless he finds amongst the results displayed an advertisement about 
which he wishes to know the details. However, in that case, he is directly routed to 
the advertisement itself and, because duplicate results are grouped together, it is 
even entirely possible that he will consult that advertisement on another database 
site.”120 
V. ANALYSIS 
The message behind the answers of the CJEU in Innoweb is clear, but a ques-
tion that immediately springs to mind is whether other kinds of taking of advantage 
on the Internet such as deep linking aren’t necessarily so near to’’nearly’ parasiti-
cal. The Court clearly was not able to resist the temptation to protect AutoTrack’s 
existing business model, without assessing whether all of its components are really 
indispensable for the recouping of the investment in its database. 
GasPedaal was apparently not using a deeply integrated booking interface. 
Instead, it required all transactions to take place on the website of the indexed 
websites like AutoTrack. In this sense, GasPedaal was generating some additional 
traffic and referring new consumers to AutoTrack. At the same time, by pursuing 
its profit-generating motifs, GasPedaal was advancing transparency on the market, 
decreasing the transaction costs for the consumers, and therefore, also intensifying 
competition on the market with second hand cars. It is true that car ads were often 
cross-posted, which made mentioned effects weaker than in airline tickets market, 
for example, but the service nevertheless still contributed to a decrease of consum-
er search costs. The price paid by AutoTrack was at the same time very modest. It 
was losing only some new direct home page visits of its website and some possible 
visits of cross-posted advertisements, but still preserved the possibility to sell the 
complementary products. 
And even this loss is not absolute. The courts decision does not rule out data 
scraping for comparative purposes altogether, but implicitly requires that referred 
users be directed to the homepage of the supplier, and not to a concrete offer. This, 
considering the impatience of Internet users, might in fact drive already referred 
users off of the supplier’s website. Consequently, it is possible that  homepage 
linking from search results would cause the source website to earn even less than 
deep-linking.121 In this light, it really seems that the owner of a database de facto 
117. See id. at ¶ 45. 
118. See id. at ¶ 47. 
119. See id. at ¶ 48. 
120. See id. at ¶ 49. 
121. This speculation can be empirically tested, and it would have an interesting implications for 
the policy debate. 
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objects only to objective comparison per se, and not to any detriment to his in-
vestment due to the decline in the advertising revenue. The objection of to deep-
linking then appears as a ‘parasitical mask’ of deeper ‘anti-transparency’ motifs.122 
Moreover, the website would be losing the same kind of traffic as well if 
somebody sets up for example an email notification service based on AutoTrack 
database, with deep-links to its offers, or when newspapers refer to a specific loca-
tion on the website instead of the homepage.123 From the business perspective, it is 
of course understandable that an incumbent like AutoTrack was resisting this level 
of transparency and comparison of its services in the context of its competitors. 
From a policy perspective, however, making such comparisons dependent on the 
consent of market participants nears its practical prohibition. And if the established 
incumbents resist the addition of their services to comparison websites, small ser-
vices start losing the benefits from meta search engines at a greater rate than be-
fore. This is because like comparative advertising,124 they enable consumers to 
consider alternatives in light of objective criteria like price, quality, warranty, and 
other factors.. If a big player is missing in the comparison, so is the bigger picture 
of the market. 
Furthermore, even if an investment protection is granted, the protection can-
not serve to make the investor absolutely immune from any competition. As noted 
above, the Directive does not prohibit any kind of taking of advantage from the 
protected investments, but only one that “go[es] beyond users’ legitimate rights 
and thereby harm[s] the investment.” A comparison of the services based on objec-
tive criteria is such a legitimate interest of users. It cannot be said that permitting 
the comparison would significantly undermine the incentive behind creating such a 
database. On the contrary, it maximizes the public good by both preserving the 
economic incentives in investments, but also encouraging the exchange of infor-
mation about prices and products, without which there can be little, if any, compe-
tition.125 This kind of rationale is not alien to the European law as the Directive on 
misleading and comparative advertising tries to safeguard the very same balance. 
And the requirement that such transparency won’t be misused is also partially 
guaranteed by the European laws against misrepresentation126 
The BGH, unlike CJEU, in its earlier Paperboy and Automobil-Onlinebörse 
rulings did not overlook these policy considerations. In fact, the BGH decided to 
 122. Recently, the German National Competition Authority raised objections against the vertical 
distribution agreements that prohibit on-line sales and inclusion in the price comparison websites. It 
labeled such clauses as anti-competitive. See Bundeskartellamt takes a critical view of restriction of 
online distribution by ASICS , BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2014/28_04_2014_Asics
.html?nn=3591568 (noting “However, ASICS prohibits its dealers from selling on online market places 
and supporting price comparison engines. This is overshooting the mark.”). 
 123. Cf. The Decision Of The German Federal Supreme Court (BGH), Case I ZR 259/00, Paper-
boy, (holding this type of service not to fall into the scope of the right of the database maker). 
 124. See Council Directive 2006/114, 2006 O.J. (L 376/21) 114 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 
2006/114] (concerning misleading and comparative advertising). 
 125. Brief for Bidder’s Edge, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s 
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C - 99 – 21200RMW). 
 126. Directive 2006/114 on Unfair Commercial Practices; see Versandkosten bei Froogle, I ZR 
140/07, BGH, 2007 (Ger.) (application to the comparison websites). 
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stress them as still applicable even in its decision, Flugvermittlung im Internet, 
rendered after the Innoweb ruling when interpreting unfair competition law 
grounds. The Court rejected an act of unfair competition arguing that: 
The underlying consideration is that an entrepreneur, who makes his of-
fer publicly available on the Internet, must accept in the general interest 
of general functioning of the Internet that his information will be pro-
cessed in the automated manner by the conventional search engines and 
will be provided to the users to satisfy their search-needs. Therefore, he 
must also accept that the loss of some income from the advertising due to 
the users, who will not search out his website. On the other hand, the 
general interest is not anymore affected, when the entrepreneur restricts 
by technical means the possibility of automated obtaining of the data of 
his Internet offer.127 
These decisions of the BGH, driven by market transparency and pro-
competition considerations128 thus stand in the stark contrast to the ruling of the 
CJEU. 
A.  Doctrinal considerations 
Doctrinally, a more compelling issue of the Innoweb decision is related to the 
right-to-consult the database.129 If the database maker makes the contents of that 
database freely accessible to third parties, even if he does so for a consideration, 
his sui generis right does not enable him to prevent such third parties from consult-
ing that database for informational purposes.130 This right-to-consult is, however, 
is of very little significance if the intermediaries cannot offer secondary services 
enabling such consulting for users. In such a case, the right-to-consult will always 
cover only the route intended and offered by the database maker, thus effectively 
guaranteeing its distribution channel. In a sense, even a provider of an Internet 
browser like Firefox, which would deviate from the intended route to the database 
contents (e.g. a plug-in switches off the advertising on the website), can find itself 
disfavored by the website owner, because it technically carries out a user’s request 
to consult the contents of the database. Holding that any intermediary which per-
forms such requests in a real time should be also cumulatively attributed use of 
 127. In original, the part reads: “Dem liegt die Erwägung zugrunde, dass sich ein Unternehmer, der 
sein Angebot im Internet öffentlich zugänglich macht, im Allgemeininteresse an der Funktionsfähigkeit 
des Internets daran festhalten lassen muss, dass die von ihm eingestellten Informationen durch übliche 
Suchdienste in einem automatisierten Verfahren aufgefunden und dem Nutzer entsprechend seinen 
Suchbedürfnissen aufbereitet zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Er muss deshalb auch hinnehmen, dass 
ihm Werbeeinnahmen verlorengehen, weil die Nutzer seine Internetseite nicht aufsuchen [..]. Dagegen 
ist das Allgemeininteresse an der Funktionsfähigkeit des Internets dann nicht mehr betroffen, wenn der 
Unternehmer durch technische Maßnahmen verhindert, dass eine automatisierte Abfrage der Daten 
seines Internetangebots möglich ist [..].” 
128. See Flugvermittlung im Internet, I ZR 224/12, ¶41, BGH, 2012 (Ger.). 
 129. See Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media BV, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 46; C-203/02, 
The British Horseracing Board Ltd. and Others v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS ¶ 54; Directmedia Publishing GmbH v. Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg, 2008 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS ¶ 51. 
130. See Innoweb, C-202/12, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 46; The British Horseracing Board 
Ltd.,C-203/02, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 55; Directmedia, C-304/07, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 53. 
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parts of the database by its users, would mean exorbitantly expanding the scope of 
the rights. And the court surely does not want to achieve this. Because the use that 
would be allowed to end users, would then be prohibited for ‘middle-men’ to assist 
in. Thus, this prohibition would be socially ineffective since it would leave users 
alone and create a certain bottle  neck effect. 
A parallel to this phenomenon can be found in copyright law, specifically in 
the exception of private copying. If a user cannot take advantage of intermediary 
help in the course of making a private copy, the exception is rendered nearly use-
less. We all need to create such copies using intermediaries like print shops, librar-
ies or even technical equipment manufactured by someone else. The Court in 
Innoweb metaphorically equates the sum of private copies of users to a library with 
a copying machine, which would makes libraries infringers. One should remember 
that even reel-to-reel tape recorder litigation in Germany131 that eventually led to 
imposition of copyright levies began when users needed to pay license fees for use 
of their devices. Their original intent was only to address an inefficiency in the 
collection of the fees.132 No one would likely suggest that buyers of reel-to-reel 
recorders should be equated with direct copying of the producers themselves. Also 
US courts hearing the disputes in similar scenarios considered the claims against 
the producers/providers on secondary liability theories.133 Similarly, providers of 
software should not be attributed to acts of users, especially if those acts are per-
mitted by the law.134 
This aspect of attribution in Innoweb contrasts with the previously mentioned 
decision Automobil-Onlinebörse handed down by the German Federal Supreme 
Court (BGH). Unlike the CJEU, the BGH took the position that AutoBINGOOO, a 
provider of a software that enables the comparison of different websites with car 
ads, does not use the data of Autoscout24.de, a website with user generated car 
ads, and hence cannot be seen as a direct infringer. The Court notes: 
The defendants themselves do not realize the elements of the § 
87b(1) UrhG, because they don’t copy, distribute or make available any 
data of a car ad collection of the plaintiff, but only offer, advertise and 
distribute a software, which enables third parties to find, process and dis-
play these data.135 
 131. Decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH), Cases I ZR 8/54, I ZR 41/58, I ZR 
23/62, I ZR 127/62, I ZR 4/63.  
 132. The rate of licensing success was estimated at 0,5 % as less than 5000 private persons out of 
one million users licensed their recording devices (reported in GRUR 1965, 109). 
 133. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 (2005); see Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic 
Distributors, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). On the other hand, in Princeton Univ. Press 
v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1412 (6th Cir. 1996), the US court considered a
photocopying service that reproduced substantial parts of copyrighted works of scholarship bound into 
‘coursepacks’and sold to students, to be liable for direct infringement. 
 134. This argument, however, is not conclusive. In the recent Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502 (2014) decision, arguably the same situation happened. The users 
were able to claim permitted use, but this did not prevent the Supreme Court of the United States from 
holding that the provider of the service directly infringed. 
 135. Automobil-Onlinebörse, I ZR 159/10, ¶20, BGH, 2011 (Ger.), Automobil-Onlinebörse, para 
20 reads: “Die Beklagten verwirklichen den Tatbestand des § 87b Abs. 1 UrhG nicht selbst, da sie keine 
Daten der Automobil-Onlinebörse der Klägerin vervielfältigen, verbreiten oder öffentlich wiedergeben, 
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Instead, the BGH then focused on the conduct of users and their possible vio-
lation of the database rights of scraped websites.136 The Court found that individu-
al users do not extract a substantial part of the database because their searches are 
specific enough.137 As to possible infringement by systematic copying of insub-
stantial parts of a protected database, the BGH notes that copies made by users do 
not conflict with the normal exploitation of the database, and that the maker of a 
database cannot rely on his right against temporary copies made in the course of 
consulting the contents of the database.138 
In contrast, the Regional Court in Hamburg in Ryaniar v. Vtours came to the 
same result as BGH, but its line of argumentation is slightly different. The Court 
considered that a provider of a website (not of a software) himself uses the parts of 
the database, but only to the extent of each of the searches carried out by the users 
of a meta search engine. In other words, the Court rejected the cumulative attribu-
tion of all searches by users to the provider. Unlike BGH, however, it did consider 
them separately. Whether this different reasoning springs from the difference be-
tween the operation of a software application (BGH) and online service (OLG 
Hamburg) remains open. 
As seen above, the CJEU, without putting forward any arguments, considers 
that similar real time scraping is an act that is carried out directly by the meta 
search engine operator. Implicitly, the Court basically attributes all the searches 
cumulatively to the operator of the website. One can only speculate about the un-
derlying reasons for this decision. However, it does show how thin the line can be 
between primary and secondary liability under different intellectual property 
rights. And that such a distinction is often only a matter of perspective and can 
have significant consequences for the policy. 
B.  Practical consequences 
Even more troubling than this doctrinal issue is the practical impact of the 
decision. This decision effectively seems to outlaw the operation of some of the 
socially beneficial websites that help consumers to compare prices or qualities of 
different goods offered on the Internet. It, however, does not outlaw all the meta 
search engines. Several limitations need to be mentioned. 
First of all, as the discussion of the relevant investment and protectable sub-
ject matter has shown, not all databases will be necessarily protected in the first 
place. Where no rights are granted, of course no infringement can occur. Hence the 
infringement is more likely to occur in cases when the indexed databases contain 
user generated content (e.g. user feedback, user ads, etc.), which is often protected 
as a relevant investment, and less likely when the scraped database is created only 
sondern eine Software anbieten, bewerben und in Verkehr bringen, die es Dritten ermöglicht, diese 
Daten aufzufinden, aufzubereiten und anzuzeigen.” 
 136. The Dutch court seemed to be also stressing this in the reference to the CJEU by using words 
“makes it possible for the public to search.” 
 137. See Automobil-Onlinebörse, I ZR 159/10, ¶ 51–55, BGH, 2011 (Ger.)., Automobil-
Onlinebörse, ¶ 51–55. 
 138. See Automobil-Onlinebörse, I ZR 159/10, ¶63–64, BGH, 2011 (Ger.)., Automobil-
Onlinebörse, ¶ 63–64. 
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to support some other business of the supplier and the data used are basic opera-
tional minimum (e.g. prices of electronics resellers, flight information). This has, 
of course, a direct bearing on the operation of the meta search engines. 
Those working with unprotected databases will be able to integrate and con-
trol the booking process to a greater extent.139 Those operating with protected 
databases will have a problem even with the basic comparison techniques, which 
refer users to the source websites with a deep link. These services might continue 
to try to invoke different exceptions for their activity,140 but unless the CJEU re-
considers its overprotective approach, they would need to either license the data-
base, or develop a mode of operation that renders the database right valueless. 
Another theoretical option is that they keep comparing the databases, but refrain 
from deep linking, since much of the Innoweb decision is based on losing the 
‘homepage-income’ from the advertising. 
The development of meta search engines into a two sided market by strength-
ening the interside network effects (e.g. by engaging the users in production of a 
user generated content such as user reviews, personal profiles, future plans, etc.) is 
yet another possible consequence of the decision.141 As a consequence of this, 
suppliers that value the users more than the users value the suppliers, will still be 
charged for access to the consumers. The database right owned by these suppliers 
will be de facto licensed for free142 The meta search engine operators would be 
therefore forced to two sided market configurations, pricing structures of which 
will render the exclusionary database right useless. The drawback will be however, 
that launching such a two-sided configuration will need to be done on a bigger 
scale in order to be profitable. This in turn, could increase the barriers-to-entry for 
newcomers, thus leading to a more oligopolistic structure on the meta search en-
gine market. 
This, again, will not apply to meta search engines that source non-protected 
databases. In industries such as airlines and the electronic resale, the markets of 
meta search engines are likely to be more competitive due to the absence of the 
‘chicken-egg’ problem, or the problem of having enough suppliers affiliated when 
number of users is low, as the affiliation of new suppliers happens without their 
consent. In contrast, in the case of protected databases, the source database needs 
to be licensed143 and serious possibilities of a ‘consent hold-up’ by bigger players 
might exists. 
The most immediate outcome of the decision will probably be an attempt of 
incumbents to prevent competition in less competitive markets structures by shut-
139. Unfair competition law can limit this, however. 
 140. For instance Art. 6 and Art. 8 of the Directive or Directive on misleading and comparative 
advertising. 
141. The trend of strengthening of these network effects is well-illustrated by the Tripadvisor and 
its use of consumer reviews, which help it significantly in operation of its meta search engine – See 
How TripAdvisor Grows Scale and Network Effects: Expertise in Gathering UGC, FORBES (Jun. 20, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/avaseave/2013/06/20/how-tripadvisor-grows-scale-and-network-
effects-expertise-in-gathering-ugc/.  
 142. One can see a very similar effect with newly passed IP-law for protection of publishers in 
Germany (§ 87f at seq. UrhG), who received the special right against the search engines. 
 143. Again, a very similar effect can be observed in respect to the search market in Germany after 
passing this new IP law. 
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ting down the meta search engines.144 Unlike general search engines that generate 
more traffic than they could possibly take away, ‘comparison websites’ are very 
likely to be a nuisance for at least the bigger providers/sellers whose higher mar-
gins usually suffer from the market transparency. Making the operation of advanc-
ers of market transparency subject to approval of big players, especially when their 
smaller competitors are possibly its greatest beneficiaries, does not benefit the 
innovation or competition policy of any country. 
The impact of the Innoweb ruling will most likely be felt also outside of ac-
tivity of meta search engines. As mentioned earlier, even some activities of general 
search engines can be threatened by this decision, since many times they technical-
ly do the same as their specialized peers.145 Even the activities of data analyses 
used by commonplace smart phone applications can be easily affected if decisive 
parts of the extracted data are not the fractions used by a single individual user, but 
are instead the pool of all the data extracted by users of an application together. 
This would basically mean that any independent data analysis would be exclusive-
ly subject to the control of the platforms that collect them.146 For instance, Face-
book could prevent application developers from extracting profile data even in 
cases where users agree, only because it could claim sui generis protection over its 
cumulative data pool extracted by users of its application. 
C. Possible solutions 
Given the position of the CJEU on interpretation of the Database Directive, it 
appears very unlikely that an internal solution to socially beneficial search engines 
will come from the wording of the Directive itselfan internal solution), such as 
provisions limiting the scope of the right.147 The deficiency identified here also 
cannot be satisfactory corrected by anti-trust law because this is either too slow for 
remedying structural problems of the intellectual property,148 or is many times also 
unavailable.149 One possibility worth exploring would be to use the Directive 
2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising as an external 
limit—an exception—to the sui generis protection. 
Directive 2006/114/EC takes a horizontal approach in achieving market 
transparency. This means that it cuts through various national regulations and 
rights of others in order to guarantee possibility of an objective comparison of 
144. This seems to be the case in Denmark in a dispute of eBay v. Autouncle. See eBay Forhindrer 
Forbrugernes Overblik på Brugtbilmarkedet, AUTOUNCLE (Jul. 2, 2014), 
https://www.autouncle.dk/da/bilbasen-og-dba-dk-saetter-en-stopper-for-overblikket-paa-autouncle.  
 145. See Innoweb, Case C-202/12, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 24–29. 
 146. See De Wolf & Partners, Study on the Legal Framework of Text and Data Mining, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 37 (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/1403_study2_en.pdf.  
147. An attempt of this kind is presented in the preliminary reference before CJEU in Ryanair Ltd. 
v. PR Aviation BV, Case C-30/14 (pending case), where the referring court tries to see whether the
‘lawful user’ exception of Article 8 of the Directive could also cover the meta search engine. 
148. See Leistner, supra note 25, at 433. 
 149. See Directive 96/9, supra note 21, at recital 47. 
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goods and services.150 It does so by laying down the conditions under which com-
parative advertising is permitted. First, however, an activity must qualify as an 
‘advertising’ (Article 2(a)), and then as a ‘comparative advertising’ (Article 2(c)). 
Because meta search engines are a form of representation “in connection with a 
trade, business, craft or profession in order to promote the supply of goods or ser-
vices”, the first criterion is not a problem. The second one is, however, more diffi-
cult. Article 2(c) requires that the activity must “explicitly or by implication 
identifies a competitor or goods or services offered by a competitor”. The meta 
search engine operator, strictly speaking, does not compare its own offers with 
those of own competitors, but offers of competitors among themselves. So the meta 
search engine in fact needs to invoke the interest of the compared individual com-
petitors to legitimize its service. But this should not matter, though. 
This is because the Directive 2006/114/EC itself aims to “provide a broad 
concept of comparative advertising to cover all modes of comparative advertis-
ing.”151 It is without a doubt that meta search engines do engage in comparative 
advertising for the benefit of included suppliers. And, because meta search engines 
operate as a separate business model, the positive effects of comparison are 
achieved without the need of suppliers to draft, prepare and pay for the advertising. 
It is probably even more effective and credible because such comparison is both 
systematic and carried out by an independent third party.152 This position is in fact 
not that special. The organizations or companies carrying out consumer tests serve 
the same purpose, and only few would doubt that they should not also be benefi-
ciaries of this regime. 
Accepting this line of argument would mean that operating a meta search en-
gine will be permitted provided that it complies with the cumulative requirements 
of Article 4 of the Directive 2006/114/EC. In particular that “it objectively com-
pares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and representative features of those 
goods and services,” does not denigrate the competitors and does not take unfair 
advantage of their forms of representation. 
 150. For a suggestion that 2006 O.J. (L 376/21) 114 EC could serve as an external limit to the 
copyright law – See ANSGAR OHLY & OLAF SOSNITZA, GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN 
WETTBEWERB. UWG-KOMMENTAR 736 (5ST ED. 2010). Ohly argues that in the German context ex-
tended rule of exhaustion in the copyright law could serve to incorporate considerations of Directive 
2006/114/EC under decision of the BGH, Case I ZR 256/97, Parfümflakon. In this respect , see also the 
commentary on the CJEU decision Dior v. Evora  (Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora, 
1997 I-06013, ¶ 3), which held that free movement of goods requires that “the proprietor of a trade 
mark or holder of copyright may not oppose their use by a reseller who habitually markets articles of 
the same kind, but not necessarily of the same quality, as the protected goods, in ways customary in the 
reseller’s sector of trade, for the purpose of bringing to the public’s attention the further commercializa-
tion of those goods, unless it is established that, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, 
the use of those goods for that purpose seriously damages their reputation.” See also see more Annette 
Kur, Händlerwerbung für Markenartikel aus urheberrechtlicher Sicht - Präsentationsrecht als neue 
Schutzschranke? - Bemerkungen zu i. S. Dior ./. Evora, GRUR INTERNATIONAL, 24 (1999). 
151. See Directive 2006/114, supra note 124, at recital 8. 
 152. These are all the considerations which should have lead the CJEU to permit the meta search 
engines already on the level of the scope of the right without need to resort to any exceptions. Such 
scope of rights would be a more appropriate balance between incentives on the one hand, and access on 
the other hand, than the current rule after Innoweb ruling. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
People are often troubled with analogies that compare visits of robots to visits 
that humans pay to other’s houses without getting permission. The work that ro-
bots undertake can then easily appear as trespassing. This analogy is, however, 
very misleading. Unlike the house owners, owners of websites often don’t mind or 
even encourage such permission-less visits (e.g. Google, web archives, etc.). What 
they only mind, are some visits, that later lead to services that undermine their 
own. In this respect, these robots are more like bees coming to visit and pollinate 
the flowering crop than like human visitors. All owners of flower crops are keen to 
see bees on their land, unless their neighbors reap most of the benefit. At that 
point, coexistence is no longer attractive for one of the parties because it is not 
sustainable. And this is what the laws ought to prevent. 
This article does not suggest that all forms of meta search engines should be 
allowed. On the contrary, some models of operation of meta search engines can be 
clearly parasitic in the sense that suppliers bleed away as no sustainable relation-
ship is possible to set up and the margin is predominantly squeezed by the meta 
search engine. But such a configuration is unsustainable for the meta search en-
gines themselves, unless they want to replace the suppliers. This can, for instance, 
happen in some cases of deeply integrated direct booking systems, when all the 
additional margin stemming from complementary services is reaped only by the 
meta search engine. If this is coupled with services, which are not directly sold by 
the scraped supplier (e.g. car ads of third parties), the example of an unsustainable 
(parasitic) relationship is born. But this is an extreme example. 
The Innoweb decision, however, goes far beyond such parasitic competing 
products. It bans data-scraping of protected databases even in settings that enable 
complete symbiosis of source websites and meta search engines, with a result of 
societal benefits of increased market transparency, decreased transaction costs of 
consumers and more intensive competition on the market of supplied goods and 
services. It is submitted that although the Court of Justice of the European Union 
made a mistake by omitting this policy consideration, the regulatory framework of 
comparative advertising could still help to remedy this inconsistency by serving as 
an external limit (an exception) to the sui generis protection. 
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